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part of it, is retained at the time of a divorce, this does not
become the wife's property, but remains with her male kin.
Can there here be a confusion between bridewealth and dowry?
British anthropologists make a clear distinction, though Papps
says nobody does. The fathers of educated girls do indeed ask
a higher bridewealth, but not because education makes them
better farm workers. These girls marry salary earners in the
towns and expect to "live like ladies."

Papps: ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF BRIDE-PRICE

ever, most societies in which bride-price was or is paid lack
such markets. Papps's evidence, thus, probably comes from an
atypical case.
2. The regression analysis is based upon extremely small
samples (16 and 17 cases) and employs complex equations.
(One, for example, uses six variables.) In such samples there is
considerable probability that random values of one or two
variables will "control" the model. Therefore it is not sur-
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prising that many of the variables do not have significant
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results. Further, those which do may be explained by recourse
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to entirely different models than Papps's. For example, the

The notion that certain aspects of marriage arrangements can
be explored in a fruitful manner with the tools of economic
analysis is not a novel insight; several empirical studies (unfortunately not cited by the author) have isolated important
supply-and-demand factors underlying the bride-price. I do
not believe that Papps's study has added much to this literature.
As the author notes, the model does not tell us whether the
bride-price is positively or negatively related to fertility until

we know something about (a) relative elasticities of the supply
and demand curves and (b) shifts of these curves occasioned by
the promise of fertility: (a) The nature of marriage in many
precapitalist societies suggests that the supply curve is often
almost vertical. The author's assertion (without empirical
evidence) that the supply curve is more elastic than the demand
curve is based on a theoretical consideration that is only one of
many factors underlying such elasticities. (b) We are given no
empirical evidence to tell us whether it is reasonable to assume
that children are a public good such that the utility from them
is the same for the husband and wife. Since the maternal
mortality in such societies is so high, the woman risks her life

with the birth of each child; thus her discounted utility of
enjoyment of children might be much less than that of her
husband. In such a case the supply curve shift accompanying
greater fertility might be less than the demand curve shift, so
that the correlation between potential fertility and the brideprice might be positive, not negative.

The other propositions (that "nice" husbands pay less, that
virgins fetch a higher bride-price than widows, and that intraclan marriages result in lower bride-prices than extraclan
marriages) are trivial applications of supply-and-demand
analysis that require no fancy diagrams or math to prove.
Since the author tells us nothing about the correlations
between the fertility variable and other variables that could
influence the bride-price, we do not know if the reported correlations could have any causal significance. The lack of tests
against alternative models of the bride-price also reduces our
confidence in the results. One unexplained technical puzzle
raises further doubts: since ordinary least-square methods are
calculated to achieve the "best fit," it is unclear why we find
much higher coefficients of determination for the two equations
where the regression line is forced through the origin.
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Papps, following Becker (1981), applies neoclassical economics
to the understanding of the family. She extends the tradition's
scope by analyzing bride-price, arguing that it is "the discounted value of part or all of the wife's share of marital
output" and as such is controlled by market forces. She claims
that an ordinary least-squares regression analysis performed
on a sample of bride-prices collected by Granqvist (1931)
supports her position. We offer the following observations:
1. Granqvist's data come from a region in which the market
as a price-fixing institution has existed for a long time. HowVol.
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consistently significant positive results for the relationship
between bride-price and husband and wife kinship may be as
well explained by customary preferences as by market forces.
Papps terms her regression analysis results "encouraging." We
concur, if it is understood by this that the results neither

strongly support nor challenge her position.
3. People paying bride-price conceive of and measure value
in very different ways than in the West. Yet Papps announces

that BPi = P,- C, where BP, is brideprice, Ci is the value
of the bride's consumption of marriage output including public

and private goods, and Pi is the total present value of public
and private goods accruing to the bride over time. Private
goods are such things as food and clothing, and public goods
seem, in the main, to be the children produced by the marriage.

The equation, if it is to make mathematical sense, requires
that a common coin of valuation exist for the very disparate
public and private goods. Yet in most societies with bride-price
there is no general-purpose money by which a valid common
valuation could be established. How, then, is the analyst to
compute the value of a private good, food, and add it to a

public one, a child, when measuring Ci and P,? Papps does not
seem aware that such validity problems exist. They are, however, very real: equations based upon measurements of different
economic values, where value is not validly measured, are
absurd.

4. Observations 1, 2, and 3 suggest that there is weak
support for Papps's position and, further, that there is little
guidance as to how to perform those analyses which might
validly provide support.
5. Many anthropologists believe that bride-prices in marketless societies are simply not prices. Radcliffe-Brown (1971:124),
for example, characterized such payments as "prestations," by

which he meant money or service "due by law or custom."
Goody and Tambiah (1973) pointedly speak only of bridewealth and never bride-price. Meillassoux (1981:64) says that
bridewealth goods have "conventional" value. The crux of the
issue is that many anthropologists believe that custom, law, or

political action set marriage payments at levels other than
those which would be imposed by market forces. However,
studies conforming to the norms of contemporary empirical
data analysis that support this position are lacking.
6. Many anthropologists have insisted that a major function
of bride-price is to create and reproduce alliances between
groups (Radcliffe-Brown 1971:129; Meillassoux 1981:61).
Alliances do not produce outputs which over time acquire
discounted values, though they may foster production activities

which have such consequences. Consequently, there is little
likelihood that the value of alliance equals the discounted
value of the wife's share of the marriage output.

7. The preceding suggests an alternative view: that in
marketless societies bride-price, like the bride, arbitrarily
symbolizes alliance and resembles gift exchange between heads
of state. The United States gives China a chair embossed with
an eagle, the Chinese reciprocate with a panda; a Toupouri in
Chad gives 11 cattle and conventionally receives a wife. Chair,
panda, cattle, and wife are arbitrary symbols of relationship.
8. Many prices observed in the contemporary world are not
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